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In re AMERCO Derivative Litigation, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 17 (May 12, 2011)
1
 
CORPORATE LAW – SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION 
Summary 
An appeal from an order to dismiss a shareholder derivative claim. 
Disposition/Outcome 
The district court‟s dismissal affirmed in part because a prior settlement barred certain 
claims and Appellants failed to plead sufficient facts for certain causes of action. The district 
court‟s dismissal reversed in part because the court incorrectly conflated the concepts and 
standing and in pari derilicto and Appellants sufficiently plead facts for other causes of action. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Leonard Shoen founded AMERCO, a Nevada corporation, in 1945. AMERCO is the 
parent company of the wholly owned subsidiary U-Haul International Inc. (“U-Haul”). Through 
U-Haul, AMERCO rents trucks, trailers and storage units to the public. Amerco Real Estate 
Corporation (“AREC”), another subsidiary of AMERCO, controls the purchase, sale, and lease 
of properties used by AMERCO. Leonard eventually transferred most of his AMERCO stock to 
his children. 
 In 1993, Leonard Shoen‟s sons Joe, James and Mark Shoen formed two SAC entities to 
serve as real estate holding corporations and evenly split the common stock. About one year 
later, Joe and James sold their stock to Mark (allegedly for one-hundred dollars) and filed for 
personal bankruptcy. The two SAC entities were merged to form a new SAC entity. Many 
additional SAC corporations and partnerships were formed thereafter, with Mark controlling 
each one. 
 In 2002 and 2003, Leonard Shoen‟s son Paul Shoen and other AMERCO shareholders 
(“Appellants”) filed individual derivative suits against Joe, James, Mark, multiple SAC entities, 
and current and former AMERCO directors (“Respondents”). The suits were consolidated. 
Appellants alleged Respondents breached their fiduciary obligations to AMERCO by engaging 
in improper and unfair transactions with SAC entities to AMERCO‟s detriment. Respondents 
filed, and the district court granted, a motion to dismiss for failure to adequately plead demand 
futility. Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada and the Court clarified the 
pleading requirements for shareholder derivative suits and remanded the case for further 
proceedings on demand futility. 
The Court also permitted Appellants to file an amended complaint. In the amended 
complaint, Appellants alleged: (1) breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty by engaging in self dealing 
against all directors; (2) aiding and abetting a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and unjust 
enrichment against the SAC entities; (3) usurpation of corporate opportunities against Mark; and 
against all respondents: (4) engaging in ultra vires acts; (5) wrongful interference with 
AMERCO‟s prospective economic advantage; (6) abuse of control. Appellants sought to end and 
unwind a series of transfers of storage properties and two hundred million from AMERCO to 
SAC. 
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 In the amended complaint, Appellants also set forth  three reasons why the AMERCO 
and SAC transactions were improper. First, AMERCO sold properties to SAC at unfairly low 
prices and failed to seek approval for these transactions from the board of directors of 
AMERCO. Second, AMERCO financed these purchases by SAC by providing over six hundred 
million in non-recourse loans. Some of the loans were made when AMERCO was in need of the 
capital for its own business. Third, AMERCO entered into management agreements pursuant to 
which U-Haul operated self-storage facilities on behalf of SAC entities. U-Haul was responsible 
for running the self-storage businesses and in return received a management fee equal to 6% of 
the gross revenue generated. Appellants alleged this arrangement was inequitable because Mark 
and the SAC entities keep the remaining 94% of revenue generated.  
Appellants further alleged that from 1995-2002 AMERCO‟s public filings misled 
shareholders by referring to the SAC entities in a confusing and distorted manner. AMERCO‟s 
public filings also failed to disclose the amount of revenue collected from the SAC entities and 
the SAC transactions. Also, Appellants alleged a demand on the board would be futile because a 
majority of the board had a material interest in the subject of the demand. Further, Joe, James, 
and Mark dominated and controlled the AMERCO board; thus, the board is not independent of 
them. 
AMERCO, through its board of directors, filed a motion to dismiss for failing to allege 
demand futility adequately. All other Respondents filed motions to dismiss because the claims 
were barred by the Goldwasser settlement, the in pari delicto doctrine, failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted, and the statute of limitations had run. 
The Goldwasser settlement arose out of a 1994 shareholder derivative suit on behalf of 
AMERCO against AMERCO management, which included Joe, James, and Mark. AMERCO 
shareholders originally sued in 1988 challenging a stock transaction that gave Joe, James, and 
Mark control. The 1988 suit resulted in the shareholders winning billions in a jury trial. The 
shareholders brought the subsequent 1994 shareholder derivative suit in part to obtain an 
injunction to prevent Joe, James, and Mark from causing AMERCO to indemnify them from the 
1988 judgment. The Goldwasser plaintiffs were also concerned about AMERCO‟s transactions 
with SAC entities. In 1995, the parties settled the 1994 suit. The settlement included a release 
clause that released claims and matters related to the SAC transactions. 
The district court initially denied AMERCO‟s motion to dismiss for failing to allege 
demand futility because appellants had shown a majority of AMERCO‟s board of directors were 
interested in the SAC transaction. However,  after a hearing on the alternative bases for 
dismissal, the district court granted the motion to dismiss because the Goldwasser settlement 
barred claims arising out of the SAC transactions and AMERCO had participated in the 
challenged transactions. 
Discussion 
Standard of review 
 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, all factual assertions in the complaint are 
considered to be true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff.
2
 A order to 
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dismiss is “rigorously reviewed.”3 If any set of facts entitle plaintiffs‟ to relief, the complaint 
survives dismissal.
4
 All legal determinations by the district court receive a de novo review.
5
 
  
The Goldwasser Settlement 
 
The Court began its analysis by noting that contract interpretation issues receive de novo 
review.
6
 Settlement agreements are contracts and thus “governed by…contract law.”7 When a 
release is unambiguous, it is construed from the language contained within.
8
 While the ultimate 
goal is to effectuate contracting parties intent, the Court will only consider circumstances 
surrounding the agreement when the intent is not clearly expressed in the contractual language.
9
 
Unless specifically contracted for, contractual release terms typically do not apply to future 
causes of action.
10
  
The Goldwasser settlement‟s definition of released claims referred to any claims that 
were, or could have, been asserted in the litigation, including unknown claims. The settlement 
further states it “fully, finally, and forever settled and released claims…which now exist or 
heretofore have existed.” 
The express language of the Goldwasser settlement referred to an intent to release only 
claims that existed at the time of signing the settlement. Further, the settlement agreement lacks 
language indicating an intent to bar future claims. The clear and explicit terms of the release bar 
any claims that were in existence of the time of signing the Goldwasser settlement, including 
claims relating to the two SAC entities that existed at the time. However, the settlement 
agreement does not bar any claims that arose after the date of the release. Thus, the Court 
affirmed the district court‟s dismissal of appellant‟s derivative claims relating to pre-Goldwasser 
SAC transactions, but reversed the district court‟s order finding post-Goldwasser SAC 
transactions were barred by the Goldwasser settlement. 
The in pari delicto Defense  
 The district court imputed Respondents‟ actions to AMERCO and then relied on the in 
pari delicto defense to preclude the derivative shareholder claims because AMERCO 
participated in the transactions. The Supreme Court of Nevada stated the district court incorrectly 
conflated the concepts of standing and the in pari delicto defense. Standing and the in pari 
delicto equitable defense are separate issues that warrant distinct analysis. Generally, standing 
requires a “case or controversy” and a prudential requirement.11 Although state courts do not 
have constitutional Article III standing,  Nevada has a historical requirement of a justiciable 
controversy in order for a party to obtain judicial relief.
12
 The collusion of corporate insiders 
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does not deprive the corporation of standing, but may allow for the assertion of an equitable 
defense (in pari delicto).
13
 Thus, the district court improperly concluded AMERCO‟s 
participation in wrongdoing divested it of standing. 
 After finding the district court erred in dismissing the claims due to lack of standing, the 
Court then clarified Nevada‟s approach to the in pari delicto doctrine. The doctrine prevents 
recovery when the party who suffered injury participated in the wrongdoing. The rationale 
behind this doctrine is that society lacks an interest in providing accounting between 
wrongdoers.
14
 In addition, permitting corporations to sue their co-conspirators would “diminish 
board‟s incentive to supervise their own agents.”15 To assess whether in pari delicto applies in 
shareholder derivative suits, a court must first determine whether the acts of the director or 
officer are imputed to the corporation and, if so, address the elements of the in pari delicto 
defense. 
 The Court recognized that basic corporate agency law allows actions of corporate agents 
to be imputed to the corporation.
16
 This encourages careful selection and monitoring of those 
chosen to act on the corporation‟s behalf.17 However, if agents are acting on their own behalf, 
their actions will not be imputed to the corporation.
18
 This exception is referred to as the „adverse 
interest” exception. While Nevada previously recognized the exception, the Court never set forth 
its proper application and took this opportunity to do so now. 
 The Court held that, under the “adverse interest” exception, the agent‟s actions must be 
completely and totally adverse to the corporation to invoke the exception. The exception is 
narrow. The rule avoids ambiguity when there is a benefit to both the wrongdoer and the 
corporation.
19
 A mere conflict of interest will not invoke the exception.
20
 
 The Court then recognized a limited exception to the “adverse interest” exception, the 
“sole actor” rule. If the agent is the sole agent or shareholder of a corporation, then his acts are 
imputed to the corporation. The Court stated the rule also applies when there are multiple 
owners/managers each engage in fraud against the corporation. The agent‟s knowledge is 
imputed in such circumstances because the “principal and agent are virtually the same person.”21 
 In deciding the role of the innocent decision-makers, the Court considered other courts 
approaches. These approaches include assessing how much control the innocent decision-maker 
had to thwart the fraud, the amount of authority bestowed upon the agent, and the irrelevancy of 
innocent-decision makers.
22
 The Court concluded that since the “sole actor” rule imputes 
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conduct otherwise subject to the “adverse interest” exception when the agent and the corporation 
are indistinguishable, the proper analysis is that the presence of innocent decision-makers is only 
relevant to assess whether there is a sole actor. 
 The Court then determined the actions of Respondents could be imputed to AMERCO 
because they were agents of the corporation and the “adverse interest” exception (and thus, the 
“sole actor” rule) did not apply to this case. The Court pointed out Appellants‟ did not allege that 
Respondents totally abandoned AMERCO‟s interests. While Respondents‟ actions benefitted 
them, they also benefitted the corporation, as evidenced by the management agreement. The 
allegations show less than total abandonment of AMERCO‟s interests.  
However, the imputation of the acts did not end the Court‟s inquiry into the in pari 
delicto defense. The defense should not preclude a shareholder derivative suit if: (1) the public 
could not be protected because the transaction is complete; (2) no serious moral turpitude is 
involved; (3) the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault; and (4) applying the rule 
will result in defendant being unjustly enriched at the expense of plaintiff.
23
 The Court then 
remanded the issue back to the district court to assess the factors and determine whether the 
defense may assert it in this case. 
Demand Futility 
 Pursuant to NRCP 23.1, persons filing a shareholder derivative suit face a heightened 
pleading requirement. Shareholders either must state with particulars the demands made on the 
board to take corrective action and why it failed to obtain such action, or give reasons why such 
a demand was not made. If the pleading requirement is not satisfied, the suit is dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  
 To determine whether a demand on the board is excused Nevada either applies the 
Aaronson test or the Rales test.
24
 The Aaronson test applied when the wrong was a business 
decision of the board.
25
 The Rales test applies when the board considering the demand is not 
implicated in the challenged transaction.
26
 Since there were no challenges to board decisions, the 
Court held the Aaronson test does not apply; rather, the Rales test does. 
 Under the Rales test, a court must evaluate whether particularized facts in the complaint 
raise reasonable doubt that the board could exercise its independent and disinterested judgment.
27
 
Directors‟ impartiality either can be shown by demonstrating a majority are beholden to 
potentially liable directors or would be materially affected in a manner not shared by the 
corporation and the stockholders.
28
 Mere threats of holding directors who approve the 
wrongdoing liable is not enough.
29
 If at least half of the board members are interested, a demand 
is not required.
30
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 The Court then considered whether at least half of AMERCO‟s eight member board were 
interested. Appellants alleged that board members Bayer, Carty, and Dodds all filed false annual 
AMERCO reports. Appellants further alleged that while Bayer was president of AREC, he 
approved the sale of 100 properties to SAC at unfair prices and used AREC resources to aid SAC 
in the purchase of self-storage properties without disclosing the information to AMERCO 
stockholders.  In his capacity as director of another AMERCO subsidiary, Bayer approved over 
100 million in non-recourse loans to SAC, which SAC used to purchase AREC properties, and 
concealed the nature and scope of AMERCO relationship with SAC entities.   
Appellants further alleged that Carty and Dodds, acting as directors of U-Haul, 
authorized millions in non-recourse loans to SAC entities. Moreover, as directors of AREC, 
Carty and Dodds consented to the sale of hundreds of properties to the SAC entities.  Appellants 
also alleged that Joe, James, and Mark so dominated and controlled the AMERCO board that the 
three men would never act out against them because the Shoen brothers had the power to fire 
them and end their pension benefits. 
 In addition, Appellants alleged that Carty and Dodds had close personal relationships 
with Joe, James and Mark Shoen. Carty was Mark and Joe‟s close uncle and a father figure to the 
men. Close familial relationships such as these create doubt regarding impartiality.
31
 Appellants 
further alleged Carty always sided with Joe and James Shoen during the family feud and was 
even placed back on the AMERCO board by Joe after a different Shoen brother had fired him. 
Finally, Appellants alleged Dodds had supported Joe Shoen throughout the family feud and was 
rewarded by being chosen by Joe to purchase some of the AMERCO stock. Dodds did not have 
enough money to purchase the stock so Joe and the AMERCO board loaned him the money. 
 Viewing all allegations as true, the Court concluded that five members of AMERCO‟s 
eight member board were interested. Consequently, Appellants alleged sufficient facts 
demonstrating a demand on the board would be futile.The Court then remanded to the district 
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine as a matter of law whether the demand was, in fact, 
futile. 
Sufficiency of the Complaint 
 The Court turned its attention to whether Appellants sufficiently pleaded their causes of 
action.  Appellants alleged the directors of AMERCO breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by 
self-dealing and usurping corporate opportunities and SAC entities aided and abetted these 
breaches. The duty of loyalty requires directors, in good faith, to put the corporation‟s and its 
shareholders‟ interest first.32 To prove breach of fiduciary duties, Appellants must prove 
directors actions or failure to act was a breach and the breach involved intentional misconduct, 
fraud, or a knowing violation of the law.
33
 Since this claim includes allegations of fraud, the 
claim must be stated with particularity.
34
 
 The Court next examined whether Appellants had set forth a claim for breach of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty as to Mark Shoen. Appellants alleged that Mark was self-interested in 
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the transfer of AMERCO assets to SAC entities and placed his interest above AMERCO‟s by 
causing AMERCO to sell properties to SAC at below market prices. Appellants further alleged 
that Mark usurped AMERCO‟s corporate opportunities because he used knowledge he gained as 
an officer of AMERCO to cause SAC to purchase properties AMERCO was interested in and 
without obtaining disinterested director approval. Based on these facts, the Court determined 
Appellants had set forth a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty for which relief could 
be granted against Mark Shoen. 
The Court focused next on the breach of fiduciary duty claim against the remaining 
directors.  Appellants claimed that the below market sale of Joe and James Shoen‟s stock in SAC 
entities to Mark Shoen led to the inference they had a continuing pecuniary interest. The Court 
found, however, that this allegation did not meet the heightened pleading standard and therefore 
affirmed the dismissal of the claim in regards to Joe and James Shoen.  Appellants also alleged 
the other AMERCO directors breached their fiduciary duty because they filed public filings that 
contained insufficient information.  The Court found this allegation did not rise to level of 
intentional misconduct or fraud, and consequently affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the 
other directors. 
 The Court then took the opportunity to recognize a claim for aiding and abetting a breach 
of fiduciary duty. The Court adopted the Delaware standard. Under this standard, Appellants 
must show: (1) fiduciary relationship; (2) breach; (3) third-parties knowing participation in the 
breach; and (4) damages resulting from the breach.
35
 Since Mark Shoen owned and controlled 
the SAC entities, The court held the claim against the SAC entities for aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty was improperly dismissed by the district court. 
 The Court next discussed the dismissal of Appellants' ultra vires claims. An act is ultra 
vires if it goes beyond the powers allotted by the articles of incorporation or state law.
36
 As long 
as the act is within corporate power, it does not matter if the act was done without authority or in 
an unauthorized manner.
37
 Appellants alleged that the directors acted in violation of the articles 
of incorporation when it conducted business without prior shareholder approval.  However, 
AMERCO‟s articles of incorporation  permits such actions as long as the directors obtained 
shareholder approval.  Thus, the acts were unauthorized, but not ultra vires. 
 The next allegation the Court considered was  wrongful interference with prospective 
economic advantage against all Respondents. To show wrongful interference, five factors must 
be proved: (1) prospective contractual relationship between plaintiff and third party; (2) 
defendants knowledge; (3) preventing the relationship with intent to harm plaintiff; (4) no 
privilege of justification for defendant actions; and (5) actual harm resulting from defendants 
conduct.
38
 Since this claim is not based on fraud, it is only subject to a general pleading 
requirement.
39
 Appellants alleged: (1) AMERCOhad prospective relationships with customers 
who would have rented storage facilities from U-Haul, (2) Respondents were aware and acted 
with intent to harm AMERCO, (3) AMERCO sold properties at below market prices to SAC 
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preventing AMERCO from realizing the profit it would have, and (4) the shareholders suffered 
irreparable harm. Based on these allegations, the Court held appellants stated enough to sustain 
this claim. 
 The last cause of action the Court addressed was for unjust enrichment against the SAC 
entities. This claim is also measured against the general pleading standard. Unjust enrichment 
occurs when a person retains a benefit belonging to another.
40
 Appellants alleged SAC entities 
received and kept money and property belonging to AMERCO. Thus, the Court concluded the 
claim was pleaded sufficiently. 
Statute of Limitations   
 Finally, the Court determined whether Appellant‟s claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations. If the statute of limitations has run on a claim, dismissal is appropriate. Because a 
breach of fiduciary duty is analogous to a claim for fraud,  a three-year statute of limitations 
applies.
41
 The statute begins to run once Appellants knew or should have known about the 
breach.
42
 Disclosure of the transaction without disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction is not enough.
43
 Claims for wrongful interference and unjust enrichment are subject 
to a four-year statute of limitations.
44
 Whether the statute of limitations has run is a question of 
fact. Since the district court never addressed this claim and the pleadings are sufficient to create a 
question of fact on the issue, the Court remanded the issue so the district court could make a 
finding. 
Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part: Justice Pickering 
 Justice Pickering concurred with the majority that neither the Goldwasser settlement nor 
the in pari delicto doctrine precludes this suit as a matter of law. She also agreed with the 
dismissal of certain claims and with the majority‟s decision to remand the case to the district 
court. However, she would have also dismissed Appellants claims for wrongful interference. She 
argued that the only wrongful acts alleged against the directors was the breach of the duty of 
loyalty, and since that was dismissed the wrongful interference claim must also fail. 
 Justice Pickering also concurred in remanding the issue of demand futility back to the 
district court. However, she did not like the majority taking the first stab at determining whether 
directors were disinterested. She claimed demand futility must be assessed at the time the 
amended complaint was filed. The focus of the inquiry is whether directors were interested in the 
decision to sue.
45
 Since a derivative suit reallocated authority to decide to sue from the board to 
shareholders, Appellants must state why the demand would be futile. While Appellants are 
entitled to reasonable factual inferences, conclusory allegations do not fall into that category.
46
  
Demand will only be excused as futile if there is a reasonable doubt a majority of the 
board is disinterested or independent. Justice Pickering noted the only claims that survived the 
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motion to dismiss were against Mark Shoen and the SAC entities.Only Joe and James Shoen are 
close enough family members to be deemed disinterested automatically. Consequently, Justice 
Pickering would have required more facts to be alleged in order to deem the other directors as 
interested, especially since appellant Paul Shoen served on AMERCO‟s board while some of the 
transactions between AMERCO and the SAC entities took place. 
Conclusion 
 Nevada now recognizes the in pari delicto defense in shareholder derivative lawsuits. To 
assess whether in pari delicto applies in shareholder derivative suits, a court first must determine 
if the acts of the director or officer can be imputed to the corporation. Generally, actions are 
imputed to officers and directors because they are acting as agents for the corporation. Nevada 
also recognizes an “adverse interest” exception to the imputation of acts. If the officer or director 
is acting solely in his own interest and on his own behalf, then the actions will not be imputed to 
the corporation. A limited exception to the narrow adverse interest exception is the “sole actor” 
rule. If the principal and agent are virtually the same person, the acts can be imputed to the 
corporation. Additionally, a “sole actor” can be one person or multiple people. Innocent decision 
makers are only relevant to assess whether a sole actor exists. If the actions can be imputed to the 
corporation, the court then must determine if the suit should be precluded using the Shimrak 
factors. 
 Nevada also now recognizes a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duties. 
The Court adopted the Delaware standard. Under the Delaware standard, to establish aiding and 
abetting plaintiffs must prove: (1) prospective contractual relationship between plaintiff and third 
party; (2) defendants knowledge; (3) preventing the relationship with intent to harm plaintiff; (4) 
no privilege of justification for defendant actions; and (5) actual harm resulting from defendants 
conduct. 
 
